

Optimizing Epistemic Model Checking Using Conditional Independence (Extended Abstract) *

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This paper shows that conditional independence reasoning can be applied to optimize epistemic model checking, in which one verifies that a model for a number of agents operating with imperfect information satisfies a formula expressed in a modal multi-agent logic of knowledge. The optimization has been implemented in the epistemic model checker MCK. The paper reports experimental results demonstrating that it can yield multiple orders of magnitude performance improvements.

1 Introduction

Epistemic model checking [12] is a technique for the verification of information theoretic properties, stated in terms of a modal logic of knowledge, in systems in which multiple agents operate with imperfect information of their environment. It has been applied to settings that include diagnosis [6], and reasoning in game-like settings [13, 14, 10], concurrent hardware protocols [3] and security protocols [1, 5, 21].

The contribution of the present paper is to demonstrate that conditional independence techniques from the Bayesian Net literature [17, 23, 8] can be applied in the context of epistemic model checking. We develop a generalization of these techniques for a multi-agent modal logic of knowledge, that enables model checking computations for this logic to be optimized by reducing the number of variables that need to be included in data structures used by the computation.

We have implemented the technique in the epistemic model checker MCK [12]. The technique developed can be applied for other semantics and algorithms, but we focus here on agents with *synchronous perfect recall* and model check the reduced representation using binary decision diagram techniques. The synchronous perfect recall semantics presents the most significant challenges to the computational cost of epistemic model checking, since it leads to a rapid blowup in the number of variables that need to be handled by the symbolic model checking algorithms.

The paper presents experimental results that demonstrate that the conditional independence optimization yields very significant gains in the performance of epistemic model checking. Depending on the example, the optimization yields a speedup as large as four orders of magnitude. Indeed, it can yield linear growth rates in computation time on examples that otherwise display an exponential growth rate. It adds significantly to the scale of the examples that can be analyzed in reasonable time, increasing both the number of agents that can be handled, the length of their protocols, and the size of messages they communicate.

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2 Background: Epistemic Logic

We begin by recalling some basic definitions from epistemic logic and epistemic model checking. We use *epistemic variable structures*, a particular concrete representation of Kripke structures (it can be shown that there is no loss of generality). We show how these structures arise in a multi-agent setting in which each agent's behaviour is described by a program.

Let V be a set of atomic propositions, which we also call *variables*. An assignment for a set of variables V is a mapping $\alpha : V \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$. We write $assgt(V)$ for the set of all assignments to variables V . We denote the restriction of a function $f : S \rightarrow T$ to a subset R of the domain S by $f \upharpoonright R$.

The syntax of epistemic logic for a set A_gts of agents is given by the grammar

$$\phi ::= p \mid \neg\phi \mid \phi \wedge \psi \mid K_i\phi$$

where $p \in V$ and $i \in A_gts$. That is, the language is a modal propositional logic with a set of modalities K_i , such that $K_i\phi$ means, intuitively, that the agent i knows that ϕ . We freely use common abbreviations from propositional logic, e.g., we write $\phi_1 \vee \phi_2$ for $\neg(\neg\phi_1 \wedge \neg\phi_2)$ and $\phi_1 \Rightarrow \phi_2$ for $\neg\phi_1 \vee \phi_2$ and $\phi_1 \Leftrightarrow \phi_2$ for $(\phi_1 \Rightarrow \phi_2) \wedge (\phi_2 \Rightarrow \phi_1)$. We write $vars(\phi)$ for the set of variables occurring in the formula ϕ .

Define an *epistemic variable structure* over a set of variables V to be a tuple $\mathcal{M} = (A, O, V)$ where $A \subseteq assgt(V)$ and $O = \{O_i\}_{i \in A_gts}$ is a collection of sets of variables $O_i \subseteq V$, one for each agent i . Intuitively, such a structure is an alternate representation of an epistemic Kripke structure, where the indistinguishability relation for an agent is specified by means of a set of variables observable to the agent. The elements of A correspond to the worlds of this Kripke structure. The relation \sim_i on worlds for agent i is defined by $u \sim_i v$ when $u \upharpoonright O_i = v \upharpoonright O_i$.

The semantics of epistemic logic is given by a ternary relation $\mathcal{M}, w \models \phi$, where $\mathcal{M} = (A, O, V)$ is an epistemic variable structure, $w \in A$ is a world of \mathcal{M} , and ϕ is a formula. The definition is given recursively, by

1. $\mathcal{M}, w \models p$ if $w(p) = 1$, for $p \in V$,
2. $\mathcal{M}, w \models \neg\phi$ if not $\mathcal{M}, w \models \phi$,
3. $\mathcal{M}, w \models \phi_1 \wedge \phi_2$ if $\mathcal{M}, w \models \phi_1$ and $\mathcal{M}, w \models \phi_2$,
4. $\mathcal{M}, w \models K_i\phi$ if $\mathcal{M}, u \models \phi$ for all worlds $u \in A$ with $w \sim_i u$.

Intuitively, the clause for the operator K_i says that $K_i\phi$ holds when ϕ is true at all worlds that the agent considers to be possible. We write $M \models \phi$ when $M, w \models \phi$ for all worlds $w \in W$.

In the context of model checking, one is interested in analyzing a model represented as a program. We now show how programs generate a Kripke structure that serves as their semantics. We work with a very simple straightline programming language in which a multi-agent scenario is represented by each of the agents running a protocol in the context of an environment. The syntax and operational semantics of this language is shown in Figure 1.

Intuitively, all variables (represented by non-terminal v) in this fragment are boolean, and e represents a boolean expression. Code C consists of a sequence of assignments and randomization statements $rand(v)$, which assign a random value to v . (In a probabilistic interpretation, the random value would be drawn from a uniform distribution, but for our purposes in epistemic model checking, we interpret this operation as nondeterministically selecting a value of either 0 or 1.) Non-terminal a represents an atomic action, either the skip statement *skip*, or an atomic statement $\langle C \rangle$ consisting of code C that executes without interference from code of other agents. An agent protocol P consists of a sequence of atomic actions: protocol ε represents termination, and is treated as equivalent to *skip*; ε to capture that a

$$\begin{aligned}
e &::= v \mid \neg v \mid v \wedge v \mid v \vee v \mid \dots \\
C &::= \varepsilon \mid v := e; C \mid \text{rand}(v); C \\
a &::= \langle C \rangle \mid \text{skip} \\
P &::= \varepsilon \mid a; P \\
J &::= P \parallel \dots \parallel P \Delta C \\
(s, v := e; C) &\rightarrow_0 (s[e(s)/v], C) & (s, \text{skip}; C) &\rightarrow_0 (s, C) \\
(s, \text{rand}(v); C) &\rightarrow_0 (s[0/v], C) & (s, \text{rand}(v); C) &\rightarrow_0 (s[1/v], C) \\
\frac{a_1 = \langle C_1 \rangle \dots a_n = \langle C_n \rangle \quad C = C_1; \dots; C_n; C_E \quad (s, C) \rightarrow_0^* (t, \varepsilon)}{(s, a_1; P_1 \parallel \dots \parallel a_n; P_n \Delta C_E) \rightarrow_1 (t, P_1 \parallel \dots \parallel P_n \Delta C_E)} &
\end{aligned}$$

Figure 1: Syntax and Operational Semantics of Programs

terminated agent does nothing while other agents are still running. A *joint protocol* J , is represented by a statement of the form $P_1 \parallel \dots \parallel P_n \Delta C_E$, and consists of a number of agent protocols P_1, \dots, P_n , running in the context of an environment represented by code C_E .

There are two relations in the operational semantics. States s are assignments of boolean variables to boolean values, and we write $e(s)$ for the value of boolean expression expression e in state s . The binary relation \rightarrow_0 on configurations of type (s, C) represents *zero-time* state transitions, which do not change the system clock. The binary relation \rightarrow_1 on configurations of type (s, J) represents state transitions corresponding to a single clock tick. Thus, $C \rightarrow_0^* \varepsilon$ represents that code C runs to termination in time 0. In a single tick transition represented by \rightarrow_1 , we take the next atomic action $a_i = \langle C_i \rangle$ from each of the agents, and compose the code C_i in these actions with the code from the environment C_E to form the code $C = C_1; \dots; C_n; C_E$. The single step transition is obtained as the result of running this code C to termination in zero-time.

A *system* is represented using this programming language by means of a tuple $\mathcal{S} = (J, I, Q)$, where J is a joint protocol for n agents, I is a boolean formula expressing the initial condition, and Q is a tuple of n sets of variables, with Q_i representing the variables observable to agent i .

Given a maximum running time n , a system $\mathcal{S} = (J, I, Q)$ is associated to an epistemic variable structure $\mathcal{M}_n(\mathcal{S}) = \langle A, O, V \rangle$ as follows. A *run* of length n of the system is a sequence of states $r = s_0, s_2, \dots, s_n$, where s_0 satisfies the initial condition I and $(s_0, J) \rightarrow_1 (s_1, J_1) \rightarrow_1 \dots \rightarrow_1 (s_n, J_n)$ for some J_1, \dots, J_n . If U is the set of variables appearing in J , we define V to be the set of *timed variables*, i.e., the set of variables v^t where $0 \leq t \leq n$. We take A to be the set of assignments α_r to variables V derived from runs r by $\alpha_r(v^t) = s_t(v)$ when $v \in U$ and $0 \leq t \leq n$. For the perfect recall semantics, which is our focus in this paper, we define the observable variables O_i for agent i to be the set of timed variables v^t where $v \in Q_i$ and $0 \leq t \leq n$.

3 Example: Dining Cryptographers

We illustrate epistemic model checking and the optimizations developed in this paper using Chaum's Dining Cryptographers Protocol [7], a security protocol whose aim is to achieve an anonymous broadcast. This protocol, both in its basic form, as well as an extension that is more generally applicable, has previously been analysed using epistemic model checking [21, 2]. Chaum introduces the protocol with the following story:

Three cryptographers are sitting down to dinner at their favourite restaurant. Their waiter informs them that arrangements have been made with the maitre d'hotel for the bill to be paid anonymously. One of the cryptographers might be paying for the dinner, or it might have been NSA (U.S. National Security Agency). The three cryptographers respect each other's right to make an anonymous payment, but they wonder if NSA is paying. They resolve their uncertainty fairly by carrying out the following protocol:

Each cryptographer flips an unbiased coin behind his menu, between him and the cryptographer on his right, so that only the two of them can see the outcome. Each cryptographer then states aloud whether the two coins he can see—the one he flipped and the one his left-hand neighbor flipped—fell on the same side or on different sides. If one of the cryptographers is the payer, he states the opposite of what he sees. An odd number of differences uttered at the table indicates that a cryptographer is paying; an even number indicates that NSA is paying (assuming that the dinner was paid for only once). Yet if a cryptographer is paying, neither of the other two learns anything from the utterances about which cryptographer it is.

The solution generalizes to any number n of cryptographers C_0, \dots, C_{n-1} at the table. We may represent the protocol by means of the following program for cryptographer i , who is assumed to have a boolean variable $paid_i$ that indicates whether (s)he is the payer. (The program starts running from an initial state in which the constraint $\bigvee_{0 \leq i < j \leq n-1} \neg(paid_i \wedge paid_j)$ is satisfied.) We write \oplus for the exclusive-or.

C_i :

Observed variables: $paid_i, coin_i, left_i, say_0, \dots, say_{n-1}$

Protocol:

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    rand(coin_i) ;
    left_{i+1 mod n} := coin_i ;
    say_i := paid_i  $\oplus$  coin_i  $\oplus$  left_i
  
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All variables take boolean values. Each cryptographer is associated with a set of variables, whose values they are able to observe at each moment of time. Note that a cryptographer may write to a variable that they are not able to observe. In particular, C_i writes to the variable $left_{i+1 \bmod n}$ that is observed only by $C_{i+1 \bmod n}$.

We will work with *dependency networks* that show how the values of variables change over time. The DC protocol runs for 4 ticks of the clock, (time 0 plus one tick for each step in the protocol), so we have instances $v^0 \dots v^3$ of each variable v . Figure 2 shows the dependencies between these instances. The figure is to be understood as follows: a variable v^t takes a value that directly depends on the values of the variables $u_1^{t-1} \dots u_n^{t-1}$ such that there is an edge from u_j^{t-1} to v^t . Additionally, there is a dependency between the initial values $paid_i^0$ captured using a special variable p_{init} . (We give a more formal presentation of such dependency structures below.) The observable variables for agent C_0 have been indicated by rectangles: timed variables inside these rectangles are observable to C_0 .

4 Valuation Algebra

Shenoy and Shafer [25, 27] have developed a general axiomatic formalism that captures the key properties that underpin the correctness of optimization methods used for a variety of uncertainty formalisms. In particular, it has been shown that this formalism allows for a general explanation of variable elimination algorithms and the notion of conditional independence used in the Bayesian Network literature [17],




Figure 2: Timed-variable dependency graph after program unfolding

and applies also in other contexts such as Spohn’s theory of *ordinal conditional functions* [28]. There is a close connection also to ideas in database query optimization [20] and operations research [4]. We show here that Shenoy and Shafer’s general axiomatic framework applies to epistemic model checking. This will enable us to apply the variable elimination algorithm to derive techniques for optimizing epistemic model checking.

We begin by presenting Shenoy and Shafer’s framework, following [16]. Let $Vars$ be a set of variables, with each $v \in Vars$ taking values in a set Ω_v . For a set X of variables, the set $\Omega_X = \prod_{x \in X} \Omega_x$ is called the *frame* of X . Elements of Ω_X are called *configurations* of X . In case $X = \emptyset$, the set Ω_X is interpreted as $\{\langle \rangle\}$, i.e., the set containing just the empty tuple. We write D for $\mathcal{P}(Vars)$.

A *valuation algebra* is a tuple $\langle \Phi, dom, e, \otimes, \downarrow \rangle$, with components as follows. A state of information is represented in valuation algebra by a primitive notion called a *valuation*. Component Φ is a set, the set of all valuations, and dom is function from Φ to D . Intuitively, for each valuation $s \in \Phi$, the domain $dom(s)$ is the set of variables that the information is about. For a set of variables X , we write Φ_X for the set of valuations s with $dom(s) = X$. Component e gives an element $e_X \in \Phi_X$ for each $X \in D$. A valuation algebra also has two operations $\otimes : \Phi \times \Phi \rightarrow \Phi$ (combination) and $\downarrow : \Phi \times D \rightarrow \Phi$ (marginalization), with \otimes , intuitively, representing the combination of two pieces of information, and \downarrow used to restrict a piece of information to a given set of variables. Both are written as infix operators. From marginalization, another operator $- : \Phi \times Vars \rightarrow \Phi$ called *variable elimination* can be defined, by $s^{-x} = s \downarrow (dom(s) \setminus \{x\})$.

These operations are required to satisfy the following conditions:

- VA1. *Semigroup.* \otimes is associative and commutative. For all $X \in D$ and all $s \in \Phi_X$, we have $s \otimes e_X = e_X \otimes s = s$.

- VA2. *Domain of combination.* For all $s, t \in \Phi$, $dom(s \otimes t) = dom(s) \cup dom(t)$.
- VA3. *Marginalization.* For $s \in \Phi$ and $X, Y \in D$, the following hold:
 $s \downarrow X = s \downarrow X \cap dom(s)$ $dom(s \downarrow X) = X \cap dom(s)$ $s \downarrow dom(s) = s$.
- VA4. *Transitivity of marginalization.* For $s \in \Phi$, and $X \subseteq Y \subseteq Vars$,
 $(s \downarrow Y) \downarrow X = s \downarrow X$.
- VA5. *Distributivity of marginalization over combination.* For $s, t \in \Phi$, with $dom(s) = X$, we have $(s \otimes t) \downarrow X = s \otimes (t \downarrow X)$.
- VA6. *Neutrality.* For $X, Y \in D$, $e_X \otimes e_Y = e_{X \cup Y}$.

A key result that follows from these axioms, called the *Fusion Algorithm* [26], exploits Distributivity of Elimination over Combination to give a way of computing the result of a marginalization operation applied to a sequence of combinations, by *pushing in* variable eliminations over elements of the combination that do not contain the variable.

For a finite set $S = \{s_1, s_2, \dots, s_k\} \subseteq \Phi$, write $\otimes S$ for $s_1 \otimes s_2 \otimes \dots \otimes s_k$. We define the *fusion* of S via $x \in Vars$ to be the set $Fus_x(S) = \{(\otimes S_+)^{-x}\} \cup S_-$ where we have partitioned S as $S_+ \cup S_-$, such that S_+ is the set of $s \in S$ with $x \in dom(s)$, and S_- is the set of $s \in S$ with $x \notin dom(s)$. That is, in the fusion of the set S with respect to x , we combine all the valuations with x in their domain, and then eliminate x , and preserve all valuations with x not in their domain.

Suppose we are interested in computing $(\otimes S) \downarrow X$, for S a finite set of valuations, and $X \subseteq Vars$. The Fusion Algorithm achieves this by repeatedly applying the fusion operation, using some ordering of the variables in X . We write $dom(S)$ for $dom(\otimes S) = \bigcup \{dom(s) \mid s \in S\}$

Theorem 1 ([26]) *Let S be a finite set of valuations, and $X \subseteq Vars$. Suppose $dom(S) \setminus X = \{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n\}$. Then $(\otimes S) \downarrow X = \otimes Fus_{x_n}(\dots (Fus_{x_1}(S)))$.*

Each ordering of the variables $x_1 \dots x_n$ gives a different way to compute $(\otimes S) \downarrow X$. A well chosen order can yield a significant optimization of the computation, by keeping the domains of the intermediate valuations in the sequence of fusions small. Finding an optimal order may be computationally complex, but there exist heuristics that produce good orders in practice [22, 18].

We now show that the relational structures that underly Kripke structures are associated with algebraic operations that satisfy the conditions VA1-VA6. It will follow from this that the Fusion algorithm can be applied to these structures.

Let \mathcal{V} be the set of all variables. Values in the algebra will be *relational structures* of the form $s = (A, V)$, where $V \subseteq \mathcal{V}$ and $A \subseteq assgt(V)$. The domain of a relational structure is defined to be its set of variables, i.e. if $s = (A, V)$ then $dom(s) = V$. We define the identities e_X and operations \otimes of combination and \downarrow of marginalization as follows. Let $s_1 = (A_1, V_1)$ and $s_2 = (A_2, V_2)$ and $X \subseteq \mathcal{V}$. Then

- $e_X = (assgt(X), X)$,
- $s_1 \otimes s_2 = (A, V)$ where $V = V_1 \cup V_2$, and $A \subseteq assgt(V)$ is defined by $\alpha \in A$ iff $\alpha \upharpoonright V_1 \in A_1$ and $\alpha \upharpoonright V_2 \in A_2$.
- $s_1 \downarrow X = (A, V)$ where $V = V_1 \cap X$, and $A = \{\alpha \upharpoonright X \mid \alpha \in A_1\}$.

To use terminology from relational databases, $s_1 \otimes s_2$ is the join of relations and $s \downarrow X$ is the projection of the relation s onto attributes X . The following result is straightforward; these properties are well-known for relational algebra.

Proposition 1 *The algebra of relational structures satisfies axioms VA1-VA6.*

We may extend the operation of marginalization in this valuation algebra to epistemic variable structures as follows. If $\mathcal{M} = (A, O, V)$ is an epistemic variable structure and $X \subseteq V$, we define $\mathcal{M} \downarrow X = (A', O', V')$ where $A' = \{\alpha \upharpoonright X \mid \alpha \in A\}$ and $O'_i = O_i \cap X$ for all $i \in \text{Agts}$ and $V' = V \cap X$. In general, this operation results in agents losing information, since their knowledge is based on the observation of fewer variables. Below, we identify conditions where knowledge is preserved by this operation.

5 Conditional Independence and Directed Graphs

Let $X, Y, Z \subseteq V$ be sets of variables. The notion of conditional independence expresses a generalized type of independency relation. Variables X are said to be conditionally independent of Y , given Z , if, intuitively, once the values of Z are known, the values of Y are unrelated to the values of X , so that neither X nor Y gives any information about the other. This intuition can be formalized for both probabilistic and discrete models. The following definition gives a discrete interpretation, related to the notion of *embedded multivalued dependencies* from database theory [11].

Definition 1 Let $A \subseteq \text{assgt}(V)$ be a set of assignments over variables V and let $X, Y, Z \subseteq V$. We say that A satisfies the conditional independency $X \perp Y \mid Z$, and write $A \models X \perp Y \mid Z$, if for every pair of worlds $u, v \in A$ with $u \upharpoonright Z = v \upharpoonright Z$, there exists $w \in A$ with $w \upharpoonright X \cup Z = u \upharpoonright X \cup Z$ and $w \upharpoonright Y \cup Z = v \upharpoonright Y \cup Z$. For an epistemic variable structure $\mathcal{M} = (A, O, V)$, we write $\mathcal{M} \models X \perp Y \mid Z$ if $A \models X \perp Y \mid Z$.

Conditional independencies can be deduced from graphical representations of models. Such representations have been used in the literature on Bayesian Nets [23, 17], and have also been applied in propositional reasoning [8, 9]. The following presentation is similar to [8] except that we work with relations over arbitrary domains rather than propositional formulas.

The notion of d -separation [23] provides a way to derive a set of independency statements from a directed graph G . We present here an equivalent formulation from [19], that uses the notion of the *moralized* graph G^m of a directed graph G . The graph G^m is defined to be the undirected graph obtained from G by first adding an edge $u - v$ for each pair u, v of vertices that have a common child (i.e. such that there exists w with $u \rightarrow w$ and $v \rightarrow w$), and then replacing all directed edges with undirected edges. The set of *parents* of a node u is defined to be the set $pa(u) = \{v \in V \mid v \rightarrow u\}$. For a set of vertices X of the directed graph G , we write $An(X)$ for the set of all vertices v that are ancestors of some vertex x in X (i.e., such that there exists a directed path from v to x). For a subset X of the set of vertices of graph $G = (V, E)$, we define the restriction of G to X to be the graph $G_X = (V \cap X, \{(u, v) \in E \mid u, v \in X\})$. For disjoint sets X, Y, Z , we then have that X is d -separated from Y by Z if all paths from X to Y in $(G_{An(X \cup Y \cup Z)})^m$ include a vertex in Z .

A *structured model* for a valuation algebra $\langle \Phi, \text{dom}, e, \otimes, \downarrow \rangle$ over variables Vars , is a tuple $M = \langle V, E, \mathcal{S} \rangle$ where $V \subseteq \text{Vars}$ is a set of variables, component E is a binary relation on V such that $G_M = (V, E)$ is a dag, and $\mathcal{S} = \{s_v\}_{v \in V}$ is a collection of values in Φ such that for each variable $v \in V$, we have

- $\text{dom}(s_v) = \{v\} \cup pa(v)$, i.e. the domain of s_v consists of v and its parents in the dag,
- $s_v \downarrow pa(v) = e_{pa(v)}$.

Intuitively, the second constraint says that the relation s_v does not constrain the parents of v : for each assignment of values to the parents of v , there is at least one value of v that is consistent.

The following is a consequence of results in [23, 19, 29].

Proposition 2 Suppose that $M = \langle V, E, \mathcal{S} \rangle$ is a structured model and X, Y, Z are disjoint subsets of the vertices V of the directed graph $G = (V, E)$. If X is d -separated from Y by Z , then $\otimes \mathcal{S} \models X \perp Y \mid Z$.

Structured models have an additional property that provides an optimization when eliminating variables: if a leaf node is one of the variables eliminated from the combination of the nodes of the graph, then it can be removed from the model without changing the result. This is captured in the following result.

Proposition 3 *Suppose that $M = \langle V, E, \mathcal{S} \rangle$ is a structured model, let $X \subseteq V$ and let $v \in V \setminus X$ be a leaf node. Then $\otimes \mathcal{S} \downarrow X = \otimes (\mathcal{S} \setminus \{s_v\}) \downarrow X$.*

To apply these results for structured models to model checking epistemic logic, we use the following definition. We say that a structured model $M = \langle V, E, \mathcal{S} \rangle$ *represents* the worlds of an epistemic variable structure $\mathcal{M} = (A, O, U)$ if $V = U$ and $A = \otimes \mathcal{S}$. That is, the structured model captures the set of assignments making up the epistemic variable structure.

Consider the following formulation of the model checking problem: for an epistemic formula ϕ , we wish to verify $\mathcal{M} \models \phi$ where $\mathcal{M} = (A, O, V)$ is an epistemic variable structure with observable variables O , with worlds represented by a structured model $M = \langle V, E, \mathcal{S} \rangle$.

A first idea for how to optimize this verification problem is to reduce the structure \mathcal{M} to the set of variables $\text{vars}(\phi)$, together with the sets O_i for any operator K_i in ϕ . In fact, using the notion of conditional dependence, it is often possible to identify a smaller set of variables that suffices to verify the formula. The intuition for this is that some of the observed variables in O_i may be independent of the variables in the formula, and moreover, information may be redundantly encoded in the observable variables. The following definitions strengthen the idea of restricting to $\text{vars}(\phi) \cup O$ by exploiting a sufficient condition for the removal of observable variables.

Say that κ is a *relevance* function for a formula ϕ with respect to an epistemic variable structure $\mathcal{M} = (A, O, V)$ if it maps subformulas of ϕ to subsets of the set of variables V , and satisfies the following conditions:

1. $\kappa(p) = \{p\}$ for $p \in V$,
2. $\kappa(\phi_1 \wedge \phi_2) = \kappa(\phi_1) \cup \kappa(\phi_2)$,
3. $\kappa(\neg\phi_1) = \kappa(\phi_1)$, and
4. $\kappa(K_i\phi_1) = U_i \cup \kappa(\phi_1)$, for some $U_i \subseteq O_i$ with $\kappa(\phi_1) \cap O_i \subseteq U_i$ and $\mathcal{M} \models (\kappa(\phi_1) \setminus U_i) \perp (O_i \setminus U_i) | U_i$.

In the final condition, U_i can be any set. We note that a set U_i satisfying the condition can always be found. For, if we take $U_i = O_i$, then the condition states that $\kappa(\phi_1) \cap O_i \subseteq O_i$ and $\mathcal{M} \models (\kappa(\phi_1) \setminus O_i) \perp \emptyset | O_i$. Both parts of this statement are trivially true. In practice, we will want to choose U_i to be as small as possible, since this will lead to stronger optimizations.¹

Note that ϕ is a subformula of itself, so in the domain of κ . The following result says that satisfaction of ϕ is preserved when we marginalize to a superset of $\kappa(\phi)$ for a relevance function κ .

Theorem 2 *Suppose that κ is a relevance function for ϕ with respect to epistemic variable structure \mathcal{M} and that X is a set of variables with $\kappa(\phi) \subseteq X \subseteq \text{dom}(\mathcal{M})$. Then for all worlds w of \mathcal{M} , we have $\mathcal{M}, w \models \phi$ iff $\mathcal{M} \downarrow X, w \uparrow X \models \phi$.*

Computing $\kappa(\phi)$: The definition of κ provides a recursive definition by which $\kappa(\phi)$ can be calculated, with the exception that the case $\kappa(K_i(\phi)) = U_i \cup \kappa(\phi)$ allows for a choice of the set U_i , subject to the conditions $\kappa(\phi) \cap O_i \subseteq U_i$ and $\mathcal{M} \models (\kappa(\phi) \setminus U_i) \perp (O_i \setminus U_i) | U_i$. When the worlds of \mathcal{M} are represented by a structured relational model M , we show how to construct the *minimal* set U_i satisfying the

¹Since $(A \setminus C) \perp (B \setminus C) | C$ is equivalent to $A \perp B | C$, the independence condition could be more simply stated as $\kappa(\phi_1) \perp O_i | U_i$. We work with the more complicated version because the algorithm for d-separation assumes disjoint sets.

stronger conditions that $\kappa(\phi) \cap O_i \subseteq U_i$ and U_i d-separates $\kappa(\phi) \setminus U_i$ from $O_i \setminus U_i$ in the directed graph G associated with M .

Note $(\kappa(\phi) \setminus U_i) \cup (O_i \setminus U_i) \cup U_i = \kappa(\phi) \cup O_i$ for any set U_i . Thus, the d-separation properties we are interested in are computed in the moralized graph $H = (G_{An(O_i \cup \kappa(\phi))})^m$, which is independent of U_i . Let U be the set of vertices $v \in O_i$ such that there exists a path in H from a vertex $u \in \kappa(\phi) \setminus O_i$ to v , with v the first vertex on that path that is in O_i . The set U can be constructed in linear time by a depth first search from $\kappa(\phi) \setminus O_i$. Take $W = U \cup (\kappa(\phi) \cap O_i)$.

Proposition 4 *W is the smallest set satisfying the strengthened conditions for U_i .*

Unfolding a program into a structured model tends to create a large number of timed variable instances whose associated value represents an equality between two variables. Such instances can be eliminated by a simple transformation of the structured model.

For an assignment α with domain V , define $\alpha[y/x]$ to be the assignment α' with domain $(V \setminus \{x\}) \cup \{y\}$ with $\alpha(y) = \alpha'(x)$ and $\alpha \upharpoonright (dom(s) \setminus \{x\}) = \alpha' \upharpoonright (dom(s) \setminus \{x\})$. For a relational value s and variables x, y with $x \in dom(s)$ and $y \notin dom(s)$, define $s[y/x]$ to be the relational value t with $dom(t) = (dom(s) \setminus \{x\}) \cup \{y\}$, consisting of all assignments $\alpha[y/x]$ for $\alpha \in s$. Intuitively, this is simply the relation s with variable x renamed to y .

We extend this definition to structured relational models $M = (V, E, \mathcal{S})$ with $x, y \in V$, by defining $M[y/x] = (V', E', \mathcal{S}')$ with $V' = V \setminus \{x\}$, and $E' = E \cap (V' \times V')$, and $\mathcal{S}' = \{s'_v \mid v \in V'\}$, where $s'_v = s_v[y/x]$. In the following result, we write $\delta_{x,y}$ for the set of assignments α with domain $\{x, y\}$ and $\alpha(x) = \alpha(y)$.

Proposition 5 *Suppose that $M = (V, E, \mathcal{S})$ is a structured relational model with $x, y \in V$, and $\Omega_x = \Omega_y$, and $pa(y) = \{x\}$ and $s_y = \delta_{x,y}$. Let $M[y/x] = (V', E', \mathcal{S}')$. Then $\otimes \mathcal{S}' = (\otimes \mathcal{S}) \downarrow V'$.*

The definition furthermore extends to epistemic models $\mathcal{M} = (A, O, V)$ with worlds represented by a structured relational model $M = (V, E, \mathcal{S})$. Let $M[y/x] = (V', E', \mathcal{S}')$. We define $\mathcal{M}[x/y] = (A', O', V')$ where $O' = \{O'_i\}_{i \in Agts}$ where $O'_i = O_i \cup \{y \mid x \in O_i\}$ for each $i \in Agts$, and $A' = \otimes \mathcal{S}'$. Note that O'_i additionally makes variable y visible to agent i if x was visible to i , in case this variable was not originally visible.

Proposition 6 *If $\Omega_x = \Omega_y$, and $pa(y) = \{x\}$ and $s_y = \{(x : a, y : a) \mid a \in \Omega_x\}$ then $\mathcal{M}, \alpha \models \phi$ iff $\mathcal{M}[y/x], \alpha[y/x] \models \phi[y/x]$.*

The overall optimized procedure for model checking that we obtain from the above results uses the following steps:

1. We first unfold a program representation of the model into a structured relational model with symbolically represented values and transform the query into a form that uses the timed instances variables in place of the original variables. This can be done in a way that builds in the equality optimization.
2. We compute $\kappa(\phi)$ using the algorithm above.
3. We compute a symbolic representation of $\mathcal{M} \upharpoonright \kappa(\phi)$, using the leaf node elimination optimization.
4. We compute $\mathcal{M} \upharpoonright \kappa(\phi) \models \phi$ in this representation using a symbolic model checking algorithm.




Figure 3: Dining Cryptographers dependency graph after optimization

6 Example

In the present section, we illustrate this procedure on the Dining cryptographers protocol. We consider the formula

$$\phi = (\neg \text{paid}_0 \Rightarrow K_0(\neg \text{paid}_1 \wedge \neg \text{paid}_2) \vee (K_0(\text{paid}_1 \vee \text{paid}_1) \wedge \neg K_0 \text{paid}_1 \wedge \neg K_0 \text{paid}_2))$$

evaluated at time 3. The dependency graph for the protocol was given above in Figure 2. Figure 3 indicates the dependency graph that remains after we have applied the optimization procedure. The resulting formula is

$$\phi_2 = (\neg \text{paid}_0^0 \Rightarrow K_0(\neg \text{paid}_1^0 \wedge \neg \text{paid}_2^0) \vee (K_0(\text{paid}_1^0 \vee \text{paid}_1^0) \wedge \neg K_0 \text{paid}_1^0 \wedge \neg K_0 \text{paid}_2^0))$$

From the point of model checking complexity, we expect that the simplification of the dependency graph will result in significant improved performance of the model checking computation. For n cryptographers, the initial dependency graph (Figure 2 for $n = 3$) has $16n$ variables, i.e., 48 variables in case $n = 3$. The algorithm of van der Meyden and Su [21] would construct a BDD with over $12 + 4n$ variables in general, and, as show in Figure 4, with 24 variables in case $n = 3$. However, the algorithm uses an intermediate BDD representation of the transition relation of the protocol that requires $8n$ variables. Instead, the optimization approach developed here computes a BDD over just 9 variables in case $n = 3$ and $3n$ variables in general. The actual model checking computation combines BDD's associated with each node to construct a BDD over the same number of variables. Since in practice, BDD algorithms work for numbers of variables in the order of 100-200, these reductions of the constant factor can have a significant impact on the scale of the problems that can be solved.

7 Experimental Results

In the present section, we describe the results of a number of experiments designed to evaluate the performance of epistemic model checking using the conditional independence optimization, in comparison




Figure 4: Timed-variables used in algorithm of van der Meyden and Su.

with the existing implementation in MCK. (Since MCK remains the only symbolic epistemic model checker that deals with perfect recall knowledge, there are no other systems to compare to.) All experiments were conducted on an Intel 2.8 GHz Intel Core i5 processor with 8 GB 1600 MHz DDR3 memory running Mac OSX 10.10.

Except where indicated, the unoptimized model checking algorithm against which we compare is that invoked by the construct `spec_spr_xn` in the MCK scripting language, which implements the algorithm of van der Meyden and Su [21]. (We refer to this algorithm as `xn` in legends, and the algorithm using conditional independence optimization is referenced as `ci`.) The results demonstrate both significant speedups of as large as four orders of magnitude, as well as a significant increase in the scale of problem that can be handled in a given amount of time.

Dining Cryptographers: Our first example is the Dining Cryptographers protocol [7], discussed above. It was first model checked using epistemic logic in [21]. This example scales by the number n of agents; the number of state variables is $O(n)$, and the protocol runs for 3 steps. The initial condition needs to say that at most one of the agents paid – this is done by means of a formula of size $O(n^2)$. The rest of the script scales linearly. The formula in all instances states that at time 3, agent C0 either knows that no agent pays, knows that C0 is the payer, or knows that one of the other agents is the payer, but does not know which. This involves $O(n)$ atomic propositions, and is of linear size in n .

Performance results for model checking the Dining Cryptographers protocol running on a ring with n agents are shown in Figure 5(a). There is a rapid blowup as the number of agents is increased: 12 agents already takes over 46 minutes (2775 seconds). By contrast, applying the conditional independence optimization, model checking is significantly more efficient, as shown by the plot in Figure 5(b). The




Figure 5: Dining Cryptographers experiments, (a) unoptimized running times (s) and (b) optimized running times (s)

case of 12 agents is handled in 0.05 seconds, and 100 agents are handled in 9.69 seconds.

One-time Pad: The next example concerns message transmission using one-time pad encryption in the presence of an eavesdropper. Each instance has three agents (Alice, who sends an encrypted message to Bob, and Eve, who taps the wire). We scale the example by the length of the message, which is sent one bit at a time. For a message of length n , states have $O(n)$ variables. The protocol runs $2n$ steps, two for each bit. The formula is evaluated at time $2n$, and says that Eve does not learn the value of the first bit. For this example, we found that the best performance for the unoptimized version was obtained using MCK version 0.5.1, which used a different symbolic encoding of the transition relation from more recent versions. Performance of model checking is shown in Table 1.

The running times for the optimized version grow very slowly. Intuitively, the conditional independence optimization detects in this example that the first bit and the others are independent, and uses this to optimize the model checking computation. This means that for all n , the ultimate BDD model checking computation is performed on the same model for all n , and the primary running time cost lies in the generation of the dependence graph, and its analysis, that precedes the BDD computation. On the other hand, the unoptimized (xn) model checking running times show significant growth, with a large spike towards the end, where the speedup obtained from the optimization is over 10,000 times.

Oblivious Transfer: The next example concerns an oblivious transfer protocol due to Rivest [24], which allows Bob to learn exactly one of Alice’s two messages m_0, m_1 , of his choice, without Alice knowing which message was chosen by Bob. Each instance has two agents, and we scale by the length of the message. For a message of length n , states have $O(n)$ variables. We consider two formulas for this protocol. Both are evaluated at time 3 in all instances.

The first formula says that if Bob chose to receive message m_1 , then he does not learn the *first* bit of m_0 . The running times for model checking this formula are given in Table 2(a). In this example, the conditional independence optimization gives a significant speedup, in the range of one to two orders of magnitude (more precisely, 12 to 221) improvement on the inputs considered, and increasing as the scale of the problem increases. Running just the optimized version on larger instances, we find that the

n	ci (s)	xn (s)	xn/ci	n	ci (s)	xn (s)	xn/ci	n	ci (s)	xn (s)	xn/ci
11	0.02	1.25	63	21	0.04	8.42	211	31	0.05	75.13	1503
12	0.02	1.38	69	22	0.04	8.82	221	32	0.05	67.37	1347
13	0.02	2.04	102	23	0.04	11.10	278	33	0.06	97.23	1621
14	0.02	2.19	110	24	0.04	17.88	447	34	0.06	184.19	3070
15	0.02	3.98	199	25	0.04	36.68	917	35	0.06	89.47	1491
16	0.03	5.50	183	26	0.04	33.26	832	36	0.07	131.74	1882
17	0.03	5.01	167	27	0.05	23.60	472	37	0.07	164.76	2354
18	0.03	5.47	182	28	0.05	34.88	698	38	0.07	259.48	3707
19	0.03	7.24	241	29	0.05	99.50	1990	39	0.07	275.87	3941
20	0.04	9.71	243	30	0.05	50.10	1002	40	0.07	749.88	10713

Table 1: One-time pad protocol, optimized and unoptimized running times, and speedup ratio, “single-bit” formula

optimization allows us to handle significantly larger instances: up to 97 agents can be handled in under 200 seconds, compared with 19 agents in 170 seconds unoptimized.

An example in which the optimization does not always yield a performance improvement arises when we change the formula model checked in this example to one that states that if Bob chose to receive m_1 , then he does not learn the value of *any* bit of m_0 . The running times are shown in Table 2(b). Here, the optimization initially gives a speedup of roughly one order of magnitude, but on the three largest examples, the performance of the unoptimized algorithm is better by a factor of two. The lower size of the initial speedup, compared to the first formula, can be explained from the fact that there are obviously fewer variables that are independent of the second formula, since the formula itself contains more variables. (The “all bits” formula contains $O(n)$ rather than just one variable explicitly, but recall that knowledge operators implicitly introduce more variables, so the “first bit” formula implicitly has $O(n)$ variables.) It is not immediately clear exactly what accounts for the switchover.

Message Transmission: The next example concerns the transmission of a single bit message across a channel that is guaranteed to deliver it, but with uncertain delay. This example has two agents Alice and Bob, and runs for $n + 1$ steps, where n is the maximum delay. States have $O(n)$ variables. The formula considered asserts at time $n + 1$ that Alice knows that Bob knows ... (nested five levels) that the message has arrived. Because of the nesting, the algorithm used in the unoptimized case is that invoked by the MCK construct `spec_spr_nested` – this essentially performs BDD-based model checking in a structure in which the worlds are runs of length equal to the maximum time relevant to the formula.

Table 3(a) compares the performance of the conditional independence optimization with this algorithm. The degree of optimization obtained is significant, increasing to over four orders of magnitude. Running just the optimization for larger instances, we find that the optimization enables significantly larger instances to be handled in a given amount of time: as many as 65 agents in 342 seconds, compared to just 16 agents in 360 seconds for the unoptimized version.

Chaum’s two-phase protocol: The final example we consider is Chaum’s two-phase protocol [7], a protocol for anonymous broadcast that uses multiple rounds of the Dining Cryptographers protocol. Model checking of this protocol has previously been addressed in [1]. This example scales by both the number of agents and the number of steps of the protocol: with n agents, the protocol runs for $O(n)$ steps, and each state is comprised of $O(n)$ variables. We check a formula with $O(n)$ variables that says that the first agent has a bit `rcvd1` set to true at the end of the protocol iff it knows that some other agent

n	ci (s)	xn (s)	xn/ci	n	ci (s)	xn (s)	xn/ci
3	0.02	0.24	12	3	0.03	0.25	8.3
4	0.03	0.52	17	4	0.05	0.51	10.2
5	0.05	0.90	18	5	0.12	0.86	7.2
6	0.07	1.80	26	6	0.15	1.58	10.5
7	0.11	2.24	20	7	0.25	2.84	11.4
8	0.14	3.54	25	8	0.42	3.52	8.4
9	0.15	4.97	33	9	0.50	5.11	10.2
10	0.16	7.20	45	10	0.55	7.79	14.2
11	0.21	13.08	62	11	1.18	13.07	11.1
12	0.26	16.68	64	12	3.72	14.63	3.9
13	0.32	32.72	102	13	5.20	39.74	7.6
14	0.39	62.08	159	14	7.13	48.64	6.8
15	0.43	50.95	118	15	4.91	56.62	11.5
16	0.50	36.73	73	16	20.16	38.09	1.9
17	0.60	38.36	64	17	32.95	42.40	1.3
18	0.71	69.27	98	18	174.96	86.81	0.5
19	0.77	170.16	221	19	229.85	96.86	0.4
20	1.09	148.56	136	20	342.40	184.08	0.5

(a) (b)

Table 2: Rivest’s Oblivious Transfer Protocol, (a) “single-bit” formula, (b) “all bits” formula

n	ci (s)	nested(s)	nested/ci
3	0.01	0.02	2
4	0.01	0.03	3
5	0.01	0.04	4
6	0.01	0.06	6
7	0.01	0.11	11
8	0.02	0.20	10
9	0.03	0.46	15
10	0.03	1.05	35
11	0.05	2.44	49
12	0.07	5.69	81
13	0.09	14.5	161
14	0.12	34.77	290
15	0.16	89.31	558
16	0.20	360.3	1802
17	0.27	1597.91	5918

(a)

n	ci (s)	xn (s)
3	0.04	0.79
4	0.11	96.47
5	0.49	> 2 hrs
6	2.46	-
7	12.93	-
8	155.41	-
9	> 2hrs	-

(b)

Table 3: (a) Message Transmission Protocol, (b) Chaum’s two-phase protocol.

is trying to send bit 1. The protocol is more complex than the others considered above. An initial set of n “booking” rounds of the Dining Cryptographers protocol is used to anonymously attempt to book one of n slots, and this is followed by n “slot” rounds of the Dining Cryptographers protocol, in which an agent who has booked a slot without detecting a collision with another agent’s booking, uses that slot to attempt to broadcast a message. Because undetected booking collisions remain possible, collisions might also be detected in the second phase. Because of the complexity of the protocol, this example can only be model checked on small instances in reasonable time, even with the optimization. Table 3(b) shows the running times obtained: for the unoptimized version, we again used MCK-0.5.1. The running time of the unoptimized computation explodes at $n = 5$ as we increase the number of agents. The optimized computation takes significantly less time, but also eventually explodes, at $n = 9$. Thus, the optimization has doubled the size of the problem that can be handled in reasonable time.

8 Related Work and Conclusion

We conclude with a discussion of some related work and future directions.

Wilson and Mengin [30] have previously related modal logic to valuation algebra, but their definition requires that the marginalization of a Kripke structure have exactly the same set of worlds and equivalence relation, and merely restricts the assignment at each world, so their approach does not give the optimization that we have developed, and a model checking approach based on it would be less efficient than that developed in the present paper. They do not discuss conditional independence, which is a key part of our approach.

Also related are probabilistic programs, a type of program containing probabilistic choice statements, that sample from a specified distribution. The semantics of such programs is that they generate a probability distribution over the outputs. These programs may contain statements of the form *observe*(ϕ) where ϕ is a boolean condition: these are interpreted as conditioning the distribution constructed to that point on the condition ϕ . Hur et al. [15] develop an approach to slicing probabilistic programs based on a static analysis that incorporates ideas from the Bayesian net literature. There are several differences between probabilistic programs and our work in this paper. One is that we deal with discrete knowledge rather than probability – in general, this makes our model checking problem more tractable. We also reason about all possible sequences of observations, rather than one particular sequence of observations. Additionally, we allow observations by multiple agents rather than just one. Finally, via knowledge operators, we have a locus of reference to observations in our framework that is located in formulas rather than inside the program – this enables us to ask multiple questions about a program without changing the code, whereas in probabilistic programs, one would need to handle this by multiple distinct modifications of the code.

The results of the present paper concern formulas that refer (directly and through knowledge operators) only to a specific time. Our approach, however, can be easily extended by means of a straightforward transformation to formulas that talk about multiple time points, and we intend to implement this extension in future work. The technique we have developed can also be extended to deal with multi-agent models based on programs taking probabilistic transitions, which MCK already supports. Formulas in this extension would include operators that talk about an agent’s subjective probability, given what it has observed.

Other extensions we intend to implement are to enrich the range of knowledge semantics beyond the synchronous perfect recall semantics treated in this paper: essentially the same techniques will apply to the clock semantics (in which an agent’s knowledge is based on just its current observation and the current time). The observational semantics, in which the agent’s knowledge is based just on its current

observation, will be more challenging, since it is asynchronous, and knowledge formulas may refer to times arbitrarily far into the future.

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